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There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of 
self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so 
elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have 
proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining 
how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience 
settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional actions, 
including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature 
and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of 
intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility 
in the integration of causal vectors, and control.
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INTRODUCTION
The selection, planning, and execution of intentional actions are central to our inner sense of 
self and the interaction with the external world. It thus comes as no surprise that the notions 
of intentional action and agency have attracted a considerable share of attention both in philosophy 
and in cognitive science. During the last few years, a cross-disciplinary naturalistic approach 
to intentional action – whereby the reference to foundational issues and up-to-date scientific 
findings are both held to be crucial – has taken hold and progressively flourished (Jeannerod, 2006; 
Nanay, 2013; Grünbaum, 2017; Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2018; Haggard, 2019).
With this article, we  aim to contribute to an integrated comprehension of agency-related 
phenomena, paving the way for a shared definition of intentional action. Methodologically 
speaking, we  argue in favor of a view that bridges the gap between disciplinary approaches 
and promotes a multifaceted understanding of agency.
Both in philosophy and in neuroscience, interest in the topic stems from two intertwined, 
but plausibly distinguishable, perspectives, which we  define as the subjective and the objective 
side of agency. The former can be  referred to as concerning the subjective feeling surrounding 
self-attributions of agency. This subjective or phenomenological side of agency has been extensively 
reviewed elsewhere (Moore and Obhi, 2012; Grünbaum, 2015; Braun et  al., 2018). Therefore, 
we  will only briefly touch upon it (see the section “The Subjective Side of Agency”). The 
latter, which is the target of the present article, refers to the enabling conditions for intentional 
agency, i.e., the behavioral and neurophysiological features that qualify an action as an intentional 
Bonicalzi and Haggard New Perspectives on Intentional Action
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1193
one, besides the agent’s distinctive experience accompanying 
action initiation and outcome production.
Isaiah Berlin famously distinguished between two basic 
concepts of freedom, namely freedom from or negative freedom, 
and freedom to or positive freedom. Freedom from consists in 
the absence of obstacles or constraints to one’s own action. 
By contrast, freedom to identifies the possibility to autonomously 
determine and achieve individual or collective purposes (Berlin, 
1969). In the context of the present article, we  borrow Berlin’s 
distinction in view of discussing two different approaches to 
intentional action. Recent cognitive neuroscience of action often 
considers intentional actions as movements that are not triggered 
by external stimuli, and are therefore internally generated 
(Passingham et  al., 2010). The intentional action is thus free 
from the external constraints represented by the stimulus and 
the movements to which it leads. In that sense, cognitive 
neuroscience has to date aligned mostly with freedom from. 
A positive account of intentional action, based on freedom to, 
remains underspecified in the current cognitive neuroscience 
literature. This article sketches how this gap might be  filled 
(see the section “The Objective Side of Agency”).
In the philosophy of action, the concepts of intentional 
action and action are often treated as synonyms. In this review, 
we examine intentional action in the wider context of voluntary 
behavior. In particular, we suggest that awareness of the intentions 
that are seen as causes of one’s own behavior may represent 
the distinctive feature of intentional action with respect to 
other forms of voluntary behavior. In the section “The Causal 
Theory of Action,” we  introduce the causal theory of action 
comparing it to non-compositional accounts of action (see the 
section “An Anti-compositionalist Understanding of Action”). 
Building on this, in the section “A Gradualist Understanding 
of Action” and “The Temporal Structure of Intentions,” we defend 
a gradualist but still causal understanding of action. In the 
section “Are Conscious Mental States Causally Relevant?,” 
we  address the question about whether full-fledged intentional 
action requires intentions to have a causal role at the time of 
action initiation, by discussing Libet’s experiments on the timing 
of conscious will. While addressing some criticism to Libet-
type experiments, we  suggest that an active role for intentions 
is not necessarily tied to action initiation. By overcoming the 
simplistic difference between internally and externally generated 
actions (see the section “Internally Generated and Externally 
Triggered Actions”), we argue for a multilayered understanding 
of intentional actions whereby intentional actions are 
characterized by autonomy (see the section “Intentional Actions 
and Autonomy”), flexibility in the integration of causal vectors 
(see the section “Intentional Actions and Causality”), and control 
(see the section “Intentional Actions and Control”).
THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE OF AGENCY
The most striking feature of intentional actions might be  of 
a phenomenological nature. Intentional actions are accompanied 
by a distinctive sense of agency, whose presence is seen as 
necessary for somebody to qualify as an agent and not just 
as a physical cause of an outcome (Gallagher, 2007). The sense 
of agency accompanying intentional actions has been defined 
as the sense of being in control of our actions and, through 
them, of their consequences in the outside world (Haggard, 
2008). Individuals are generally expected to have an immediate 
intuitive appreciation of whether they authored an action or 
not, despite possible ambiguities at the level of individual causal 
roles (Blakemore et  al., 2003). To give an example, if Peter is 
part of a platoon shooting a prisoner, he  might doubt whether 
his bullet reached the target and whether his gun contained 
a real bullet or the blank that is conventionally put in one 
of the rifles used. However, he  is likely to know whether 
he  pulled the trigger or not. He  will have a sense of agency 
with respect to firing the gun if he  pulls the trigger, and 
he  will not have this sense if he  does not pull the trigger.
The sense of agency has been further analyzed in terms of 
a feeling of agency (FoA), which is a preconceptual low-level 
experience not necessarily reaching the level of consciousness, 
and a judgment of agency (JoA), which is based on high-level 
cognitive processes, possibly linked to causal attributions 
(Synofzik et  al., 2008).
The subjective sense of agency can be  measured via explicit 
and implicit measures. In experimental paradigms adopting 
explicit measures, participants are required to evaluate their 
past performances, e.g., reporting their feeling of control over 
the outcome of a process or judging whether they authored 
an action or not. The assumption is that subjects will make 
the requested evaluation depending on their subjective feeling 
at the time of the action (van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002). 
By contrast, implicit measures, including the intentional binding 
effect and sensory attenuation in self-touch (Pyasik et al., 2019), 
do not rely on subjective self-assessments of performance, but 
instead use indirect readouts of the subjective perception of 
one’s own agency. Implicit measures, or combinations of implicit 
and explicit measures, are generally preferred to the extent 
that they are thought to be  immune from idiosyncratic and 
person-level cognitive biases in self-attribution of agency.
The intentional binding effect (Haggard et  al., 2002) has been 
indicated as a potential implicit measure for the sense of agency 
in both healthy individuals and patients with an abnormal 
perception of agency. Haggard and colleagues showed that, when 
an action (e.g., key press) is followed by an effect (e.g., auditory 
tone), participants perceive the temporal interval between the 
action and the outcome as shorter than it is in reality. Assuming 
that the subjective perception of causing an outcome has to 
do with perceived temporal proximity (Hume, 1738/1978; Blakey 
et  al., 2018), the intentional binding effect may hint at the fact 
that participants implicitly connect the action and the effect in 
a meaningful causal sequence (Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007). 
Crucially, the effect is only produced when participants voluntarily 
press the key, and absent when the corresponding bodily movement 
is passively executed. For this reason, the intentional binding 
effect is considered to be  an implicit marker of agency, i.e., 
the subjective temporal compression is present when intentional 
processes are at play, and is widely used in experiments 
investigating volitional (i.e., intentional) processes and causation 
(Moore and Obhi, 2012; Fereday and Buehner, 2017).
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To the extent that the intentional binding effect is an implicit 
marker of agency, it is not automatically informative about 
the subjective explicit feeling of agency. First, it is possible, 
in principle at least, that a subject exhibiting a higher intentional 
binding effect explicitly reports a lower sense of control, in a 
given task, than a subject exhibiting a low intentional binding 
effect. Second, action and outcome might be perceived as close 
together in time for reasons unconnected with agency, given 
that a myriad of factors affect human time perception. Indeed, 
the exact relation between implicit and explicit markers of 
agency is a matter of dispute (Ebert and Wegner, 2010; Dewey 
and Knoblich, 2014), and a clear grasp of the mechanisms 
and computations underlying the sense of agency is still lacking 
(David et  al., 2008). Third, some recent experimental evidence 
has shown that physical causation, in the absence of intention, 
may effectively produce a similar binding pattern (Buehner and 
Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2015; Suzuki et  al., 2019).
However, some arguments supporting the linkage between 
the intentional binding effect and the explicit sense of agency 
can be  provided. Experimental factors that have proven to 
impact on the magnitude of the intentional binding effect 
are both associated to variations in explicit markers of agency 
(Chambon et al., 2013) and treated as relevant for conceptual 
models of intentional action (Nozick, 1969; Kane, 1996; 
Mele, 2002). These factors include presence of motivations 
or reasons for acting (Borhani et  al., 2017), obedience to 
an external coercive source of authority (Caspar et al., 2016), 
availability of multiple options (Barlas et  al., 2018), and 
fluency of the action selection process and outcome monitoring 
(Sidarus et  al., 2017).
In natural settings, an impoverished integration of sense 
of agency and voluntary behavior is known to characterize 
several neurological alterations, such as schizophrenia, alien 
hand syndrome, Parkinson’s disease, and psychogenic disorders 
(Blakemore et  al., 2002; Garbarini et  al., 2016; Saito et  al., 
2017). Patients affected by Tourette’s syndrome routinely 
engage in movements that are subjectively perceived as 
“compulsive” or “unwilled” (Rae et  al., 2019) but are enabled 
by the activation of brain areas normally sub-serving the 
production of voluntary actions, such as the cortico-striato-
thalamo-cortical pathways (Bohlhalter et  al., 2006).
In laboratory-based settings, evidence from brain stimulation 
has suggested that, in given circumstances, the sense of agency 
and the performance of voluntary movements may also come 
apart. In particular, stimulation of the supplementary and 
pre-supplementary motor areas in neurosurgical patients can 
artificially induce a feeling described as the urge to move the 
corresponding body part (in the absence of any real movement), 
or produce the performance of bodily movements that patients 
identify as their own. Instead, controlled stimulation of the 
primary motor area may lead patients to perceive their own 
movements as imposed from without (Fried et  al., 1991; 
Desmurget et  al., 2009).
By contrast, in healthy subjects, the sense of agency naturally 
accompanies the ongoing performance of voluntary movements. 
Such a smooth attunement between actual movements and 
the sense of agency might depend on the fact that the same 
neural circuits, including the pre-supplementary motor area 
(pre-SMA) and the primary motor cortex (M1) (Moore and 
Obhi, 2012), are seemingly involved in producing both the 
sense of agency (i.e., the intentional binding effect) and the 
corresponding bodily movement.
Psychologist Daniel Wegner has provided a series of results 
aimed at showing that subjects are unable to reliably judge 
their authorship over actions, mistakenly reporting that they 
have initiated actions that were in fact produced by others 
(Wegner, 2002). The overall claim that people are not reliable 
in their self-attribution of agency is not new. Bandura reported 
the presence of self-serving biases in the attribution of agency, 
with people systematically vindicating the authorship of actions 
with positive results and dismissing that of actions with negative 
outcomes (Bandura, 1982; Beyer et al., 2017). However, Wegner’s 
conclusion has a wider significance to the extent that it is 
not limited to specific instances of intentional behavior. In 
particular, self-attributions of agency, linking the intention, the 
action, and the outcome in a meaningful chain of events, 
would ultimately depend on erroneous inferential processes 
that take place retrospectively, after outcome presentation (see 
also Banks and Isham, 2009). The experience of mentally 
causing an action would be  generated after the outcome is 
produced. The reason why agents embark in the process of 
attributing causal power to mental events would be  due to 
the need to make sense of their behaviors in relation to the 
outside world. That post facto evaluations have an influence 
on self-attributions of agency is not surprising. In particular, 
misattributions of agency may occur in ambiguous circumstances 
when, for example, more than one agent is participating in 
the task and potentially contributing to the outcome.
Clearly, independently of their predictive or postdictive 
origin, self-attributions of agency are extremely valuable to 
the agent for navigating the environment and modulating future 
behavior by learning action-outcome contingencies. Furthermore, 
current evidence is seemingly insufficient to prove that self-
attributions of agency are entirely the by-products of inferential 
processes: not all experimental findings support such a 
homogenous interpretation. That the sense of agency can 
be  elicited in neurosurgical patients in the absence of bodily 
movements (see also Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008) seemingly 
suggests that the outcome is not strictly needed for the sense 
of agency and the related experience of intending to act to arise.
THE OBJECTIVE SIDE OF AGENCY
In this section of the paper, we  focus on the objective side 
of agency. The aim is to identify the features that make an 
action an intentional one, besides the subjective feeling of the 
agent who is involved in action production.
The Causal Theory of Action
In the philosophy of action, there is a widespread agreement 
that intentional actions are bodily movements that the agent 
is able to control and that control is an intrinsically causal 
notion (Shepherd, 2014). An almost obligatory starting point 
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in terms of conceptual models of action control is the causal 
theory of action, which has been regarded as the classic move 
for naturalizing intentional agency. According to the causal 
theory, the action is intentional if it is appropriately caused 
by conscious mental states, such as desire-beliefs or plans 
forming the intention to act (Davidson, 1963; Searle, 1983; 
Dretske, 1988; Bratman, 2000, 2007; Setiya, 2007). Similar 
bodily movements can therefore count as intentional or not 
depending on whether they originate from the agent’s intentions. 
To give an example, if I  decide to raise my arm based on 
my intention to ask the speaker a question, this counts as an 
intentional action. By contrast, if I  move my arm while asleep, 
this would not count as an intentional action. Intentions are 
intrinsically goal oriented, in the sense of having an executive 
role (i.e., bringing about the end-state) and, more controversially 
(Rooij et  al., 2002), a representational content (i.e., a model 
of the situation, the action and the end-state). The corresponding 
bodily movement has a functional role in achieving the end-state 
set out by the relevant intention.
The applicability of the causal theory extends beyond 
the philosophy of action. The claim that bodily actions are 
visible means to invisible ends and that we  are able to 
represent alternatives to our actions is crucial from a normative 
point of view. The premise of our legal systems is that, in 
most cases at least, people are punished for their actions 
to the extent that these actions represent the alterable outputs 
of the conscious intentions they endorse. The intentional 
actions we  are in control of are thus seen as proper targets 
of responsibility attributions, reward, and punishment 
(Edwards, 1958; Moore, 1993; Lagnado and Channon, 2008). 
By contrast, involuntary movements are movements that are 
not subordinate to the agent’s conscious plan: controlling 
agency – in the absence of which no one should be  held 
criminally responsible – is “the mind of a man bent on 
some conscious action” (Hart, 2008, p.  106).
To the extent that the focus is on the intention guiding 
the action, the specific bodily movement that executes such 
an intention is of a comparatively little importance. In judging 
whether a person is morally accountable and liable to (third-
party) punishment, it is the culpable action as a whole, and 
not the specific bodily movement executed by the culprit, which 
is under scrutiny. This principle finds a nice neural counterpart 
in Hebb’s theory of motor equivalence. According to the theory 
of motor equivalence, once a goal has been set, there are 
several different bodily movements that the brain could still 
select in order to achieve the same result (Hebb, 1949).
The causal view rests on the assumption that the causal 
relation between mental states and bodily actions can be framed 
as a relation between events, e.g., James’ having both the wish 
to hurt Martin and the belief that by slapping Martin in the 
face he  will hurt him cause James to slap Martin in the face. 
These events might be  ultimately reducible to or supervene 
on physical, i.e., neural, events. The advantage of such an 
event-causal view consists in the avoidance of a troublesome, 
potentially dualist reference to an agent (as a substance, in a 
Cartesian fashion) causing events, which is central to agent-
causal accounts of actions (Reid, 1788/2010, but see O’Connor, 
2009). In this respect, the event-causal account is seemingly 
better suited. However, the causal view has also witnessed 
several shortcomings, possibly leading to its breaking point.
Perhaps the most daunting challenge facing any causalist 
approach to intentional action is the problem of deviant causal 
chains (Mele, 1992; Schlosser, 2010; Shepherd, 2014). The 
problem of deviant causal chains can be  framed as follows. 
According to the causal theory of action, the ability of the 
agent to control the action is guaranteed by the very same 
fact that intentional actions are caused by some relevant mental 
states. However, there are cases in which causality seemingly 
does not imply control. This is due to some control-undermining 
event located between the agent’s mental states and the 
corresponding action taking place.
Here is our version of a deviant causal chain scenario. 
Imagine that Bill wants to shoot Joe while hiding on a tree. 
However, during the ambush, the anxious state produced by 
the wish to kill Joe makes Bill so nervous that he  starts 
trembling and inadvertently falls from the tree, ending up 
shooting Joe by mistake. Whereas there is a sense in which 
Bill’s wish to kill Joe caused the very same outcome that Bill 
intended to bring about, it is clear that Bill lacked control 
over the action. As a result, the action fails the test for 
intentionality despite Bill’s conscious mental states having a 
causal role in action production. The reason for that is that 
the outcome is not directly caused by the controlling intention, 
but indirectly caused by the uncontrolled emotional feelings 
that this intention triggers.
Envisaged by Davidson (Davidson, 1980), deviant causal 
chains have indeed become the bugbear of any causal account 
of action. In fact, it remains difficult to single out relevant 
cases of control-conveying causation, without providing mere 
ad hoc definitions excluding deviant causation by default. The 
case of deviant causal chains shows that, whereas it is relatively 
straightforward to outline a freedom from version of what 
intentional actions are not (i.e., causal chains devoid of deviance), 
a positive definition, spelling out what appropriateness is, is 
still missing.
An Anti-Compositionalist Understanding  
of Action
The problem of deviant causal chains has given many thinkers 
the license to suggest that the problem of intentional action 
cannot be solved by resorting to a causal link between mental 
states and bodily actions. Philosophers who take an anti-
compositionalist stance toward intentional action (O’Brien, 
2010; Ford, 2011; Levy, 2013, 2015) have made a recent move 
in this direction. In particular, Yair Levy has suggested that 
intentional actions must be  taken as primitive items in the 
agent’s psychological ontology. The difference between 
intentional and non-intentional actions is that intentional 
actions are bodily movements that we  can continue or stop 
at wish, e.g., Mary can stop or continue raising her arm to 
ask the speaker a question, but cannot stop or prevent herself 
from gasping. The suggestion is appealing because it readily 
taps into a straightforward understanding of the difference 
between bodily movements we  can and we  cannot control. 
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Self-control as the capacity to inhibit actions (Mischel et  al., 
1972) is indeed recognized as a key feature of human cognition 
(Filevich et  al., 2013; Ghosh et  al., 2014).
However, we  suggest that this model of action control is 
also not satisfactory. In particular, it fails to explain the source 
of control characterizing intentional agency with respect to 
other types of behavior. In particular, Levy’s suggestion is that 
intentional actions must be  treated like desires or beliefs, to 
the extent that these entities are all primitive items in people’s 
cognitive ontology. The major concern is that equating intentional 
actions to mental states, e.g., desires, beliefs, or intentions, 
may not be  helpful in terms of how to solve the problem of 
control. Beliefs, desires, or even intentions are not meant to 
be constitutively subjected to conscious control. Whereas James 
is expected to exercise control over his slapping Martin in 
the face, he  is not subjected to the same requirement for what 
concerns his inner wish to hurt Martin or his belief that he can 
hurt Martin by slapping him in the face. This is not a minor 
concern, to the extent that control, as an intrinsically causal 
notion, seems to be  one of the marks of intentional agency. 
The capacity to inhibit actions that we are not willing to initiate 
or continue is clearly an important feature of our capacity to 
control our behavior, but is not sufficient to provide a freedom 
to characterization of what a controlled action is.
A Gradualist Understanding of Action
The anti-compositionalist models of intentional action 
nonetheless pave the way for a plausibly gradualist interpretation 
of agency, including intentional and voluntary behavior, as a 
deeply unified human asset. We  can argue for this at different 
levels. At first glance, this depends on the characterization of 
voluntary action as what agents have the capacity (James can, 
i.e., is able to, slap Martin in the face) and the opportunity 
(James can, i.e., has the chance to, slap Martin in the face) 
to do. The implication seems to be  that what counts as a 
voluntary action for an individual, i.e., someone having the 
relevant capacity and opportunity (at times), might not count 
as a voluntary action for a different individual, i.e., someone 
lacking the relevant capacity and opportunity (at times). This 
has interesting implications: neurological patients with functional 
or organic movement disorders may temporarily lack the 
capacity to control types of bodily movements that healthy 
controls, or patients themselves at times, have the capacity to 
control (Hallett et  al., 2012).
A second observation is that the same type of event, e.g., 
walking, may include tokens that count as intentional actions 
(e.g., consciously walking toward the door) and tokens that 
count as mere voluntary (e.g., absent-mindedly pacing about 
the room) or even involuntary movements (e.g., sleepwalking). 
Mere voluntary behaviors include habits (i.e., repeated automatic 
behaviors), which have been extensively investigated, especially 
in animal studies, as clearly distinguishable from goal-oriented 
or teleological behavior (Dickinson and Weiskrantz, 1985). 
We  suggest that voluntary actions identify guided movements, 
i.e., distinguishable from involuntary movements (e.g., reflexes 
or spasms), which may (partially) lack conscious monitoring. 
This seems indeed the common feature underlying a vast range 
of behaviors, including minimal actions (Bach, 1978; Proust, 
2003) (e.g., scratching yourself), habitual actions that are 
performed almost unawares (e.g., brushing one’s teeth), or 
actions we  start doing and suddenly forget why (e.g., trying 
to recall what one came looking for) (Levy, 2013).
The capacity to assess the determinants of one’s own behavior 
(i.e., to reason about the reasons of one’s own actions before 
and after the action takes place) and to report one’s own 
intentions is a distinctive feature of human volitional processes 
and may help to characterize intentional, with respect to merely 
voluntary, actions. Such a characteristic of intentional action 
is often neglected in the cognitive neuroscience of actions and 
remains difficult to assess. Nonhuman animals are presumably 
capable to interact with the environment in order to satisfy 
internal preferences in view of presumptive rewards (Dickinson 
and Balleine, 2002). The human capacity for voluntary actions 
seemingly does not represent a radical departure from this 
general capacity to act based on punishments and rewards. 
However, intentional actions may represent a subset of voluntary 
behavior characterized by conscious awareness or monitoring 
in selecting the goal and in carrying out the corresponding 
bodily movement.
The almost exclusive focus on intentions as the conscious 
psychological states triggering actions has often overshadowed 
the fact that most of our actions do not in fact exhibit the 
features of full-fledged intentional behavior. To support action 
control, the relevant intention must occur before the bodily 
movement, so that it can work as the explanation or the reason 
for the action, e.g., James slapped Martin in the face because 
he wanted to hurt him. However, not all actions fit this model. 
We  constantly engage in voluntary actions we  can stop at 
wish had we  acquired awareness of them, but where no 
temporally prior intention is clearly present. Absentminded 
voluntary bodily movements are clearly difficult to investigate 
empirically, since experimental paradigms usually require subjects 
to attend to their actions in order to report what they did.
The Temporal Structure of Intentions
To defend a causalist approach to action, one has to explain 
mere voluntary actions as well. One way to do so consists in 
appealing to the temporal structure of intentions (Bach, 1978; 
Searle, 1983; Bratman, 1987; Mele, 1992). In particular, Searle 
distinguishes between prior intentions, setting up the action 
before it actually takes place, and intentions in action, continuously 
present during action performance. Whereas not all actions 
are preceded by prior intentions, all actions display intentions 
in action. In this more limited sense, all actions are guided 
by conscious mental states. In particular, merely voluntary 
actions are intentional actions lacking prior intentions, but 
not intentions in action.
The relation between intention and conscious experience is 
controversial, and slippery. For example, it seems to be  the 
case that mere voluntary actions may lack conscious intentions 
in action as well. If Mary absent-mindedly paces about the 
room [Searle’s example of an intentional action not guided by 
prior intention (Searle, 1983, p.  84)], it is doubtful whether 
any conscious intention in action is guiding her behavior. 
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Whereas full-fledged intentional behavior is characterized by 
conscious awareness, other forms of voluntary behavior are 
guided in the absence of the agent’s conscious awareness. 
Building on this model, Pacherie (2008, 2015) has operationalized 
the traditional distinction between prior intentions and intentions 
in action in terms of different levels of action specification, 
sub-served by three types of intentions. Distal intentions operate 
at a highest/more abstract, context-independent, level, by setting 
up the overarching goal of the action and the appropriate 
sub-goals that are necessary to reach the overarching goal. 
Proximal intentions transfer the general action plan, set up 
at the previous level, into the current situation of action and 
select the appropriate motor planning. Finally, motor intentions 
(crucially not necessarily accessible to consciousness), 
corresponding to motor representations, are in charge of setting 
the finest parameters needed to execute the action, by using 
external sensory information.
Motor representations are nonpropositional states representing 
both the outcome of the action and the kinematic properties 
of the movement (Proust, 2003; Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2017, 
2018). However, no consensus has been reached about whether 
motor representations can count as intentions. Moreover, given 
that motor intentions are nonpropositional states, the problem 
is to explain how they can effectively interlock with propositional 
states, e.g., prior intentions, in view of a goal (Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia, 2014; Brozzo, 2017). A proper causal theory of 
action should thus offer a complete account of how different 
levels of intentions can interlock in order to initiate the action 
and coordinate the bodily movements that are necessary in 
view of a goal. An understanding of these mechanisms may 
contribute to cast light on the differences between intentional 
and mere voluntary actions.
Are Conscious Mental States  
Causally Relevant?
Causal views of intentional action share the view that, at least 
when it comes to purposeful intentional actions, conscious 
intentions, which might be reducible to or supervene on physical 
states, must play a causal role in action initiation. In contrast, 
the cognitive neuroscience of volition and action has made 
little reference to conscious mental states as the identifying 
mark of intentionality or voluntariness, or often argued against 
the causal role of conscious mental states. In the last few 
decades, the view that conscious intentions play a causal role 
in action initiation has been fiercely challenged.
In particular, Libet’s results (Libet et  al., 1982, 1983; see 
also Fried et  al., 2011) indicate that the timing of the reported 
conscious awareness of wanting to make a movement is only 
subsequent to the onset of the Readiness Potential (RP), a 
gradual increase in negativity in the electrical activity in motor 
areas peaking at the time of the movement (just before muscle 
contraction). The RP is hardly visible at the level of single 
trials (but see Schultze-Kraft et  al., 2016) but can be  extracted 
from continuous EEG signal by back averaging a number of 
epochs time-locked to individual self-paced movements. 
The method was developed by Kornhuber and Deecke (1965), 
who were the first to report the RP or Bereitschaftspotential.
In the classic experiment by Libet, participants were invited 
to repeatedly execute the same bodily movement (e.g., moving 
their wrist) at the time of their choice, while mentally noting 
the timing (with respect to a rotating clock) in which they 
felt they wanted to make a movement (i.e., they felt the urge 
to make a movement). This time (W) was then communicated 
to the experimenter. Starting 1  s or more before the onset of 
the action, the RP shows a wide distribution, with a main 
localization in the medial frontal cortex. About 500–200  ms 
before the onset of the movement, the topography shifts 
[Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP)] toward the hemisphere 
that is contralateral to the limb that is about to move (Haggard 
and Eimer, 1999, but see Schlegel et  al., 2013 for a 
failed replication).
The RP has been traditionally considered the signature of 
planning and preparing the corresponding movement. The 
absence of the RP when the action is triggered by external 
signals (Jahanshahi et  al., 1995) motivates the association 
between the RP and the volitional processes leading to action. 
Whereas the RP indicates the general intention to move, the 
LRP is associated to the moment when the brain generates 
the more specific information needed to move one limb (for 
a different interpretation, according to which W correlates with 
the peak amplitude of the LRP, i.e., higher peak amplitude of 
the LRP in early-W subjects than in late-W subjects, see 
Douglas et  al., 2015).
The reason why the presence of the RP challenges the causal 
efficacy of conscious intentions is that the RP onset is located 
before W and may potentially cause the intention to act. Clearly, 
the fact that the RP temporally precedes W does not automatically 
justify the claim that the RP causes the intention to move 
and the corresponding movement. However, if the emergence 
of conscious intentions follows the onset of the RP, the concept 
of a prior intention setting up the action in view of a goal 
starts to crumble. Epiphenomenalism is the corresponding view 
that conscious mental states cannot play a causal role in action 
production (see Nadelhoffer, 2011; Nahmias, 2014). Criticisms 
to this view, as grounded in Libet-type experiments, tend to 
focus on (1) the ecological validity and (2) the methodology 
underlying these findings. Here, we briefly review these criticisms. 
We  suggest that these criticisms appropriately target the 
limitations of Libet-type experiments without dismissing them 
as wrongheaded. We  suggest that criticizing Libet-type 
experiments as mistaken might not be  the only strategy to 
preserve intentional action. By contrast, our suggestion is that 
action initiation might not be the correct locus where we should 
look for the role of conscious intentions in action production.
The Ecological Validity of Libet-Type  
Experiments
The majority of the criticisms touches upon the trade-off 
between building an empirically tractable model of intentional 
processes and providing a more valid proxy for the understanding 
of action. Firstly, it has been argued that Libet-type experiments 
are inadequate to the scope of investigating actions guided by 
distal intentions. These actions typically depend on planning, 
i.e., the execution phase does not immediately follow the 
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deliberation phase (e.g., Nahmias, 2002; Mele, 2010). Planned 
actions are difficult to explain with reference to mistaken 
retrospective inferences following action execution. Consider 
the following case: Peter decides at t0 that he  will go to Paris 
at t1. According to the causalist model, Peter’s t0-desire to go 
to Paris at t1 and his t0-belief that, by taking the train from 
London, he  can get to Paris jointly cause him to go to Paris 
at t1, thus constituting a reason for his action. It is unclear 
how to explain away the presumptive causal power of Peter’s 
t0-desire and t0-belief – jointly setting his t0-plan to go to 
Paris and therefore his t1-action – by suggesting that only at 
t2, after action execution, he mistakenly infers that his t0-desire 
and t0-belief were causally efficacious. Since experiments on 
volition and actions are often silent with respect to these types 
of behaviors, they are inadequate to explain planned actions.
However, a way to investigate experimentally the role of 
distal and immediate intentions was envisioned by Libet’s himself 
by means of the distinction between Type I  and Type II RPs 
(Libet et al., 1983. See also Verleger et al., 2016). In performing 
the classic Libet’s task, participants were alternatively requested 
to plan when to act (Type I) or to act spontaneously (Type II). 
Libet observed that trials associated with planning exhibited 
an even earlier RP onset (about, 1.5  s or more before the 
onset of the action), while more spontaneous actions were 
characterized by a late onset (between 500 and 1,000 ms before 
the onset of the action). Such a simple paradigm clearly does 
not provide any conclusive evidence regarding the role of distal 
intentions in daily-life decision-making. However, if a lesson 
is to be taken, these findings suggest that planning may actually 
influence the RP, thus supporting both the overall view that 
the RP is tied to volitional process and the claim that conscious 
planning (as in type I RP) is associated to specific unconscious 
neural correlates (Frith and Haggard, 2018).
Second, it has been argued that Libet-type experiments are 
inadequate to understand motivationally loaded intentions 
(Lavazza and De Caro, 2010; Mele, 2010). In Libet-type 
experiments, participants have to repeat identical meaningless 
movements. Spontaneity in action is limited to deciding when 
to act, but no specific motivation or reason drives participants’ 
decision to act at t1 or t2. By contrast, conceptual models of 
intentional action are tailored to fit the rich and complex 
experience of planning, selecting, and executing a wide repertoire 
of intelligible actions: reasons play an explanatorily role with 
respect to what a person decides to do and when a person 
decides to do it.
Such a criticism is well motivated. However, we question 
the basic idea that non-motivationally loaded intentions would 
not count as proper intentions. On the one hand, daily actions 
are often characterized by a lack of clearly appreciable motivations 
or reasons (e.g., for no specific reason, Mary crosses the street 
at t1 or at t2), remaining nonetheless intentional or voluntary. 
On the other hand, it is unclear whether an increase in the 
complexity of the choice one has to make (e.g., Peter deciding 
whether to go to Paris) would translate in measurable changes 
at the level of the motor pathways enabling intentional actions.
Empirical studies have highlighted a wide range of factors 
that influence people’s choices. Primarily, anticipated rewards 
and punishments respectively mediated by the dopaminergic 
system and fear-learning-related mechanisms, shape our 
decisions by determining our preferences (Schultz, 1998; 
Seymour et  al., 2007; Robinson et  al., 2010). Differences 
between meaningless and meaningful choices are likely to 
impact on these circuits rather than on the brain mechanisms 
that are responsible for motor control, where the RP arises. 
Consider the following example: Peter has to choose between 
two possible holiday destinations by selecting between box1 
(train to Paris) and box2 (train to Edinburgh) on the computer 
screen. Different factors, notably computations of expected 
costs and benefits associated to the two available options, 
are expected to determine Peter’s final choice. Depending 
on Peter’s selection, a motor command will be  transmitted 
to the spinal cord and muscles in order for him to click 
on the chosen box on the computer screen. Whereas complexity 
at the level of the decision-making process – where reasons 
for action and preferences are involved – is likely to 
impact on the brain mechanisms computing expected 
rewards and punishments the bodily movement per se is 
comparable to the ones participants execute in Libet-types 
experiments.
Moreover, some attempts to model whether motivationally 
loaded intentions impact on the brain mechanisms underlying 
volitional processes, notably the RP, have been recently made. 
For example, Khalighinejad and colleagues embedded the Libet’s 
paradigm in a perceptual decision task in which participants 
were required to detect the motion of a display of dots toward 
the left or the right side of the screen (correct answers 
corresponded to points in the game). In each trial, participants 
had no clue about when the dots would have started moving 
to the right or the left side of the screen. If participants did 
not wish to wait anymore, they had the option to press a 
skip button and move to the next trial. Voluntary actions were 
operationalized as self-initiated skip responses to terminate the 
wait. The reason for acting (i.e., skipping to the next trial) 
consisted in avoiding potentially long delays before the dots 
started moving coherently in one direction. Since participants 
were preliminarily informed that the experiment would have 
lasted for 1  h, they had a specific reason not to wait for too 
long before skipping (in order to maximize their final reward). 
Crucially, Khalighinejad and colleagues were able to observe 
the RP also for motivated choices, thus potentially extending 
Libet’s finding to reasons-responsive (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998) 
actions (Khalighinejad et  al., 2018).
The Methodological Validity of  
Libet-Type Experiments
From the methodological perspective, a different interpretation 
of Libet-type data has recently challenged the view that the 
RP is a neural marker of the cognitive processes linked to 
the preparation of bodily movements (Schurger et  al., 2012). 
Schurger and colleagues have argued that the observed changes 
in the neural activity preceding bodily movements may 
be  ascribed to spontaneous fluctuations in the internal 
physiological noise. In this case, it would be  inappropriate to 
read the increase in negativity in the electrical activity of the 
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brain as linked to motor preparation. In fact, the timing when 
the subject executes the action would depend on the timing 
when the electrical activity reaches a given threshold (i.e., the 
neural decision to move). A stochastic source of noise in the 
brain, and not a gradual readable signal corresponding to 
action planning and preparation, would be  responsible for the 
timing when the action occurs. The model leaves open the 
possibility that the conscious decision to move now, as enabled 
by some other neural state, still plays a role in action production, 
coinciding with the time when the sensory-motor threshold 
is randomly crossed. It remains nonetheless unclear whether 
this move may counteract epiphenomenalism given that the 
time when the threshold is crossed is random (what is the 
causal role of the decision to move now?).
The already mentioned EEG experiment by Khalighinejad 
and colleagues (Khalighinejad et  al., 2018) suggests a possible 
way to reconcile the classic understanding of the RP as the 
signal of planning and preparing an action with Schurger’s 
model of stochastic processes in the brain. Indeed, the 
experimental findings hint at the specificity of the processes 
leading to intentional actions, by showing a higher reduction 
in the signal variability of internally generated actions (compared 
to externally triggered ones) starting around 1.5  s before the 
onset of the movement (and consequently before the outcome 
is produced). To model the data, Khalighinejad and colleagues 
used a stochastic accumulator model analogous to the one 
implemented by Schurger et  al., 2012. Crucially, the model 
was able to simulate the RP in the internally generated condition 
only by introducing, as an additional parameter, a reduction 
in the amplitude of the noise associated to the preparation of 
the action. This suggests a possible convergence between Libet’s 
interpretation of the RP (i.e., the RP as the sign of planning 
and preparing an action) and the more recent interpretation 
provided by Schurger and colleagues (i.e., the RP emerges as 
an artifact due to averaging processes). The RP would therefore 
reflect stochastic fluctuations of neural activity, but the decrease 
in variability in the case of internally generated actions would 
support the presence of a preparatory process prior to actions 
that are internally generated.
Internally Generated and Externally 
Triggered Actions
The above-mentioned criticisms do not undermine the basic 
claim that intentional actions are preceded by unconscious 
antecedents. A different way to argue in favor of the role of 
intentions in action productions consists in acknowledging that 
intentions may rather play a role that does not coincide with 
that of initiating the bodily movement. This requires a more 
integrated model whereby the classic causal theory is reframed 
in view of the more specific role that intentions may play at 
different stages of action production. To introduce this view, 
we  start by elucidating the mechanistic model of action 
production that is central to the cognitive neuroscience of 
action and volition.
The neuroscience of volition and action broadly distinguishes 
between voluntary and involuntary behavior, recognizing the 
former as goal-directed, i.e., aimed at achieving a willed end-state 
(Fried et al., 2017), and internally generated (Passingham et al., 
2010). Engaging in goal-directed behavior implies the capacity 
to mentally represent a willed end-state (e.g., going home), to 
compute task-related foreseeable costs (e.g., time and effort in 
getting home), and to attribute a comparative value to the 
likely achievement (e.g., getting home vs. spending more time 
at the office) (Haazebroek and Hommel, 2009). Therefore, such 
computations take into account a number of variables, including 
memories of analogous experience and previous errors, 
understanding of the general norms of behaviors, and estimation 
of the current state of one’s own body.
The comparison between internally generated (voluntary) 
and externally triggered (involuntary) actions has proven to 
be  useful to the extent that it provides a set of usable 
operational definitions for empirical research. Indeed, since 
Skinner’s work on operant and respondent behavior (Skinner, 
1948), this dichotomy has shaped most of the paradigms 
aimed at casting light on the psychological and brain 
mechanisms of volition and action. In order to isolate the 
neuroanatomical structures underlying volitional processes, 
it is indeed common to compare two experimental conditions. 
In the externally triggered or instructed one, experimental 
subjects are requested to react to a specific sensory cue (e.g., 
“press a button whenever you  see a red dot on screen”). By 
triggering the corresponding bodily movement, the external 
cue plays the role of the cause of the action. In the internally 
generated condition, subjects are asked to execute kinematically 
similar bodily movements, which can be  plausibly compared 
with the ones performed in the externally triggered condition. 
Crucially, the subject is asked to autonomously set some 
parameters of the action, e.g., when to make it (e.g., self-
paced task), what specific action to perform (e.g., choosing 
between comparable options), or whether to perform the 
action or not (e.g., veto experiments) (see Haggard, 2008; 
Krieghoff et al., 2009). Such a comparison between experimental 
conditions has revealed differences at the level of the brain 
areas that are respectively recruited for internally generated 
and externally driven actions.
Indeed, from the neuroanatomical basis, specific motor 
circuits in the brain, which are distinct from those sub-serving 
other forms of behavior, are responsible for enabling voluntary 
actions. In particular, the decision about what action to 
perform is taken at the level of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), where one out of possible alternatives is 
selected (Rowe et  al., 2000). Once the decision is made, the 
information about the selected action is forwarded to both 
the cingulate motor area (CMA), which is in charge of 
providing the motivational drive that is needed to initiate 
the bodily movement, and the pre-supplementary motor area 
(pre-SMA). The execution of all voluntary movements ultimately 
depends on the primary motor cortex (MI) – receiving afferents 
from the pre-SMA, the supplementary motor area (SMA), 
and the premotor cortex (PMC) – which transmits the motor 
command to the spinal cord and the relevant muscles. 
Depending on the planned bodily movement, MI would rely 
on the neural drive provided by the pre-SMA and SMA (for 
internally initiated actions) or the PMC (for externally 
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driven actions). This dissociation and specialization is supported 
by empirical evidence, including studies in monkeys that 
show that selective lesions of the SMA or the PMC can 
respectively impair internally generated and externally driven 
motor actions (Okano and Tanji, 1987; Passingham, 1987; 
Romo and Schultz, 1987; Deiber et  al., 1991).
Specific areas in the medial frontal and parietal lobes – 
according to a gradient from internally guided actions (medial 
aspect) to externally triggered ones (lateral aspect) – support 
the features associated to voluntary behavior, such as planning, 
inhibiting inappropriate courses of action (Filevich et al., 2013), 
or selecting the option to pursue (Jenkins et  al., 2000). Other 
connected areas are recruited in the coordination and execution 
of the different phases of action production. Prefrontal regions 
are involved in action selection and maintenance of the goal 
throughout the action, while the basal ganglia and the cerebellum 
participate in the coordination of movement and in cognitively 
loaded behavior, including planning or reward-based learning 
(Bostan et al., 2013; Pasquereau and Turner, 2013). By contrast, 
the PMC, located on the lateral surface of the cortex, immediately 
anterior to the primary motor cortex, receives inputs from 
the inferior parietal regions, providing sensory-guidance for 
the action. Notwithstanding this overall dissociation, both 
circuits converging in MI contribute to specific aspects of 
voluntary processes. For example, the circuit involving the 
PMC, which is generally associated with externally cued actions, 
might be crucial for stimulus-guided choices between alternatives 
present in the environment (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; 
Haggard, 2008).
To sum up, two distinct motor pathways enable internally 
initiated and externally triggered (or cued) actions. In the 
next section, we  will delve further into this distinction and 
its conceptual implications.
Intentional Actions and Autonomy
By neglecting the role of conscious mental states in defining 
action, the contrast between internally generated and externally 
triggered actions does not cast any light on the conceptual 
distinction between intentional (e.g., Mary is consciously raising 
her arm in order to ask the speaker a question) and merely 
voluntary behavior (e.g., Mary is absent-mindedly shifting 
position while reading a book). At the same time, similarly 
to conceptual models of action, neuroscientific ones emphasize 
the role of the causal origin or source of the action. In particular, 
neurophysiological accounts identify voluntary actions as the 
class of bodily movements that are internally generated 
(Passingham et  al., 2010). These accounts leave the source of 
the action underspecified by focusing on what a voluntary 
action is not. In this sense, they also qualify as freedom from 
models of action. These models readily tap into the intuition 
that voluntary actions seemingly originate from within (i.e., 
from some internal source of motivation), as opposed to bodily 
movements that originate from without (i.e., from some 
external clue).
In virtue of its relying on the endogeneity of voluntary 
actions, the aforementioned distinction dates back to the early 
stage of the reflection on voluntary behavior in Western culture. 
In the III book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle similarly 
distinguishes the concepts of the voluntary and the involuntary 
by providing a freedom from definition of voluntariness. According 
to Aristotle’s definition, some features must apply for the action 
to be  deemed as involuntary (Aristotle, 2000). One consists 
in the external origin of the bodily movement: the action is 
involuntarily when the movement originates from without, while 
the agent remains passive with respect to it. Interestingly, in 
this context Aristotle hints at a gradualist understanding of 
agency, by arguing that human actions can be  of a mixed or 
composite nature. This is illustrated by the case of a cargo 
that is willingly thrown overboard to save the seamen’s life 
during a storm. In this case, the origin of the action is external 
(i.e., the necessity to lighten the boat) and no clearly foreseeable 
alternative is at hand. Nonetheless, the bodily movement (i.e., 
the guided throwing of the cargo) is still willingly executed. 
Borrowing a felicitous expression by Gold and Shadlen (2007), 
voluntary actions are marked by a freedom from immediacy 
(i.e., from the immediate reaction to an externally imposed 
drive) that involuntary or mixed actions entirely or partially lack.
As emphasized by Aristotelian mixed actions, the stipulation 
of a sharp dichotomy between voluntary and involuntary actions 
may overshadow the fact that most of our voluntary goal-
directed behaviors are (also) stimulus driven, to the extent 
that they engage with, and respond to, specific features of the 
environment. It would be  therefore too simplistic to assume 
that the pair internally generated/externally driven actions maps 
into the pair voluntary/involuntary actions. Consider a situation 
where Mary starts driving her car with the purpose of getting 
home from work and stops in front of the traffic light. In 
pushing on the gas when she sees the green light, Mary is 
responding to an external cue. At the same time, she is acting 
voluntarily in a coordinated effort whose nature results from 
the combination of the distal goal (i.e., getting home from 
work), the instrumental bodily movements that are needed in 
view of the goal (e.g., pushing on the gas), and the contingent 
constraints that are in place (e.g., the rules of the road, the 
specific route she took, the mechanics of the car). A wide 
array of cues determines the goal that Mary selects and the 
bodily movements that the achievement of the goal requires.
We suggest that the distinction between voluntary/involuntary 
actions does not ultimately depend on whether the movement 
is initiated by an external cue or not. More deeply, this 
comparison hints at the degree with which the agent autonomously 
contributes to solving a task or achieving a goal. The notion 
of autonomy refers to the information the agent has to generate 
and the decisions she has to make in order to carry out the 
action. Whereas involuntary movements are automatic responses 
to preexisting sources of information, when it comes to voluntary 
behavior preexistent inputs are not sufficient to determine the 
course of the action.
As Aristotelian mixed actions show, the agent’s behaviors are 
located along the continuum that goes from reflexes to full-
fledged voluntary behavior (Haggard, 2014). To illustrate this 
point, consider the following two variants to Mary’s case. In 
case1, Mary relies on the green light in order to decide when 
to initiate the action; in case2, the traffic light happens to 
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be  broken so that it depends on Mary when to initiate the 
action, integrating different sources of information. In these two 
cases, the willed-end state is analogous (e.g., getting home from 
work), but the contribution of the agent is different to the extent 
that, in case2, she cannot entirely rely on externally available 
inputs about when to push on the gas and has to autonomously 
produce the information that is needed to fulfill the task.
Intentional Actions and Causality
In the section “Intentional Actions and Autonomy,” we  argued 
that the comparison between internally generated and externally 
triggered actions does not fully capture the distinction between 
intentional, voluntary and involuntary behaviors. We  partially 
integrated this distinction by suggesting that endogeneity is 
to be  understood in terms of the subject being partially 
autonomous in generating the information needed to solve a 
task or achieve a goal. In this section, we move a step forward 
in clarifying how to understand autonomy in relation to action 
production. Indeed, it would be  misleading to conclude that, 
in the absence of an identifiable cue, the action is 
underdetermined or happens without a cause. A causal theory 
of action can appropriately account for intentional behavior 
to the extent that it can explain it as the resultant of multiple 
integrated causal vectors.
The subjective feeling of acting without a cause is likely to 
play a major role in our pre-theoretical understanding of 
intentional action. By contrast, the agent’s behavior is routinely 
constrained by memories of previous similar experiences and 
other occurring mental states, which limit the range of available 
options working as causes of the agent’s behavior. Going back 
to our example, Mary’s autonomous decision about when to 
push on the gas is concurrently determined by her overall goal 
(e.g., getting home as soon as possible) and the inputs deriving 
from her experience as a driver (e.g., waiting until the pedestrians 
cross the street, avoid crossing when the traffic light is red).
However, intentional actions seemingly imply a specific 
moment of deliberation or choice in order to initiate a movement. 
The concept of having a choice is central to the metaphysical 
discussion about free will and determinism (van Inwagen, 1983; 
Pereboom, 2014), usually in terms of whether individuals can 
actually do otherwise, and thus have a choice, when they 
decide what to do. In this article, we  set aside the question 
of whether people have a choice in the metaphysical sense. 
Indeed, we  adopt a more limited concept of choice: when it 
comes to planned behavior (e.g., Peter is deciding at t0 whether 
to go to Paris at t1), individuals are able to engage in goal-
directed reasoning, express preferences about seemingly available 
options, and finally act upon those preferences. Alfred Mele’s 
notion of psychological autonomy is in line with these desiderata. 
According to Mele, compatibilist psychological autonomy is 
fulfilled when the following three conditions jointly hold: (1) 
the agent lacks compelling or coercive motivational states; (2) 
the agent’s beliefs are conducive to informed deliberation; (3) 
the agent is a reliable deliberator (Mele, 1995).
Options in the environment are associated to a specific valence, 
which is explicitly or implicitly taken into account by the agent 
in making her choices. This ongoing, often automatic, integration 
of different inputs in setting up plans and acting upon them 
contributes to blurring the distinction between internally generated 
and externally triggered actions. For example, previously rewarded 
goals become more likely to be  chosen again in the future, 
because of progressive reinforcement (Cushman and Morris, 
2015). For instance, had Peter’s holiday been successful, he might 
be  more prone to choose Paris as a destination in the future. 
This implies the additional capacity to monitor successful links 
between actions and outcomes and to store them in memory 
for future use. This view easily accommodates the possibility 
that, after making the decision to go to Paris, Peter inferentially 
assumes that his conscious desire to go to Paris causes his 
decision, ignoring the other (unconscious) determinants of his 
choices. Limitations in the agent’s introspective power and 
metacognitive ability do not undermine her being aware of 
ongoing deliberative processes that are expected to have a causal 
impact on the subsequent behavior.
In acting upon different internal and external causal vectors, 
humans display a high level of sophistication and flexibility 
at the level of the means the agent can deploy and at the 
level of the ends she can achieve. If Mary’s goal is to interact 
with the speaker at the end of the talk, she will be  more or 
less successful depending on her ability to adaptively modulate 
her behavior based on external constraints, e.g., in terms of 
choosing the appropriate timing, of whether to ask her question 
or not, and of what specific question to ask. If different 
opportunities arise, Mary may even set out a different goal 
and act accordingly. These choices rely on mental simulation 
of the space of action and of possible counterfactual scenarios. 
In navigating the environment, agents are constantly exposed 
to a number of cues that modulate their behavioral responses. 
Within a causalist model of action production, intentional and 
voluntary actions are therefore to be understood as the resultant 
of a number of integrated causal vectors.
Hence, two types of abilities are crucial for the agent to 
achieve a goal. On the one hand, at the level of means, the 
agent needs the instrumental knowledge that is required in 
order to translate an abstract goal into an effective course of 
action, including the capacity to select a bodily movement 
that is appropriate to the task (Ghahramani and Wolpert, 1997; 
Rowe and Passingham, 2001). On the other hand, at the level 
of ends, the agent must set her own goals based on the 
information provided by the combination of existing internal 
and external cues. Whereas intentional action presumably 
requires awareness or conscious monitoring, other forms of 
voluntary behavior are cognitively less demanding. Research 
on habitual actions has suggested that, when possible in virtue 
of the task, subjects can switch into a sort of automatic mode 
that does not imply cognitive control and is insensitive to 
outcome devaluation (Dickinson and Weiskrantz, 1985; 
Graybiel, 2008; Dezfouli et al., 2014). In line with our gradualist 
view, habitual actions can be  goal-directed or purposive (e.g., 
Mary is shifting position to be  more comfortable), despite 
lacking the conscious awareness or online monitoring that 
characterize intentional behavior.
Recent experimental evidence in the field of decision-making 
has suggested that the brain flexibly exploits both goal-directed 
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and habitual systems within the same task. Goal-directed 
decision-making relies on the individual ability to build models 
of the environment and of its dynamic evolution, in order to 
simulate future consequences of a decision. This simulation 
process is computationally expensive, prone to error and time 
consuming. Crucially, subjects have been shown to switch from 
one system to the other depending on ongoing task demands. 
When possible, subjects can thus revert to habitual decision-
making, which has the advantage of being computationally 
simpler and does not require planning. The choice of the goal 
directed vs. habitual mode depends on a number of variables 
that influence decision-making, such as time, working memory 
load, opportunity cost, or stress (Keramati et  al., 2016).
Intentional Actions and Control
In the section Intentional Actions and Causality, we  suggested 
a revision of the causal theory that acknowledges that autonomous 
actions result from the flexible integration of different causal 
vectors. This section sets out to introduce one further feature 
of voluntary behavior, namely action control. Within the 
framework of the causal theory, control is understood in terms 
of the agent’s capacity to achieve a given end-state through 
her bodily movements, by acting as she wanted to act.
However, whereas action control is crucial for voluntary 
behavior, the nature of the control-conveying property eludes 
explanation. In particular, it is unclear whether action control 
requires conscious awareness. A lively debate in the literature 
on skilled actions contends that there are situations in which 
automatic behaviors, lacking conscious monitoring or awareness, 
allow for more accurate and quicker (and thus more controlled) 
responses in rapidly changing environments (Shepherd, 2017). 
At the same time, it remains questionable whether low-level, 
automatic processes can account for the fine-grained movements 
featuring in skilled actions (Fridland, 2016). In cognate research 
fields, it has also been proposed that control can be  achieved 
in the absence of conscious awareness. For example, according 
to Dienes and Perner’s cold control theory, the agent’s successful 
response (i.e., where the subject correctly responds to the 
provided instructions) to hypnotic suggestions depends on 
forming an intention without the agent being aware of having 
formed that intention (Dienes and Perner, 2007).
It seems that we  need a distinction between two types of 
action control. The first consists in the agent’s ability to effectively 
do what she wants to do, e.g., the ability to stick to one’s 
own plans. In this sense, action control clearly requires a certain 
degree of conscious awareness (i.e., it would not make sense 
to say that the agent was able to do what she planned to do 
without the agent being at least partially aware of what she 
planned to do). The second consists in the agent’s ability to 
engage in guided behaviors. In this latter case, it is not necessary 
that the agent is aware of what she wanted to do. However, 
in both cases control implies a certain degree of matching 
between the conscious (or, possibly, unconscious) intention 
and the corresponding behavior. We  suggest that a gradualist 
approach might be  more advantageous in both cases.
For what concerns the first type, Joshua Shepherd has recently 
argued that action control is achieved when the agent acts in 
accordance with her intentions, in spite of extenuating 
circumstances that pull her in other directions (Shepherd, 2014). 
Control would thus indicate the agent’s resilience to external 
obstacles, so that the agent can be  more or less in control of 
her action depending on the extent to which she would be  able 
to do what she wanted to do, in presence of potential obstacles. 
In the case of deviant causal chain, the agent chancily achieved 
the outcome she wanted to achieve, thus lacking control across 
extenuating circumstances. In daily life, resilience, as tied to 
action control, seemingly implies that the agent’s is able to 
successfully adapt means and ends to variations in the external 
environment. When it comes to the second type, control implies 
action guidance, independently of whether the action depends 
on what the agent wanted to do. Even in this case, the action 
can be  more or less guided depending on the extent to which 
the behavioral response matches the (unconscious) intention or 
the externally driven (e.g., as in the case of hypnosis) instructions.
This variety of types of voluntary and intentional behavior 
requires a much more complex conceptual framework than the 
one originally provided by the causal theory. We  suggested that 
the underlying notions of intentional agency and control still 
require a causal approach to the extent that this is able to 
integrate the contribution of multiple consciously and 
unconsciously processed causal vectors. Theories of the cognitive 
architecture of the prefrontal cortex seem to adequately match 
this multilayered view. In particular, it has been proposed that 
control or guidance is practically achieved by means of the 
integration of the abstract level of goals and the instrumental 
level of fine-grained bodily movements. Such an integration 
might be  sub-served by hierarchical processes linking abstract 
goals with executive motor commands. In particular, the cascade 
model proposed by Koechlin and Colleagues (Koechlin et  al., 
2003; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007. For a more horizontal 
model of action control, see Uithol et  al., 2014; Schurger and 
Uithol, 2015) describes action control as a hierarchically ordered 
process made possible by a cascade of top-down control from 
rostral to caudal lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and premotor 
regions, with anterior areas devoted to deliberative, abstract, 
temporally extended action control. Different areas of the control 
network in the LPFC would be responsible for executive control, 
globally understood as the capacity to select specific actions in 
view of a goal, thus resolving the entropy or competition between 
different action representations. Throughout this multilayered 
system, executive control and action coordination would 
be nevertheless guaranteed by the tight integration of information 
across the multiple specialized prefrontal regions, varying according 
to different degrees of flexibility and capacity of abstraction.
CONCLUSION
There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action 
in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the 
environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. 
Classic models in the philosophy and cognitive science of 
action struggle to offer a positive description (freedom to) of 
intentional agency. The goal of this article was to bridge the 
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gap between disciplinary approaches in order to frame a 
conceptually rich and empirically sound model for agency. 
We  settled for a graded notion of intentional agency as a 
form of goal-directed behavior whereby the agent has the ability 
to introspect upon the conscious mental states that are seen 
as the causes of one’s own actions. Furthermore, we  relocated 
intentional action within the wider context of voluntary behavior, 
insisting on some key features, notably autonomy, flexibility 
in the integration of distinct causal vectors, and control.
Several questions remain open. Perhaps the most fascinating 
ones concern the match between what we named as the subjective 
and the objective sides of agency. In our view, the combination 
of conceptual analysis and empirical investigation is likely to 
continue playing a key role for this research field.
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